I will attempt here to convey why an Iraq invasion was the least bad option available in 2003 and why the invasion went foreward. The main reason is that the
status quo ante was untenable because the policy in place, containment, was unraveling and Saddam had proven himself to be both unpredictable and undeterrable. -BBM
Other reasons include the need to change the dynamic in the middle east and introduce freedom into the area. Freedom creates hope and control over one's life, and hope destroys the nihilism at the root of terrorism, as well as fostering prosperity.
Problems with the Iraq Status Quo Ante
Many of these arguments I originally saw presented by Kenneth Pollack, but I’ve added some of my own observations. As Clinton’s Iraq expert, few Americans are as qualified as Kenneth M. Pollack to comment on Iraq. He worked in the Central Intelligence Agency analyzing military developments in the Persian Gulf area for seven years, including the period of the gulf war. During the Clinton administration he served as director for gulf affairs with the National Security Council. His immersion over more than a decade in the vast sea of information available to the United States government has enabled him to offer a comprehensive analysis of United States-Iraqi relations, conditions in Iraq, the nature of Saddam Hussein's rule and his aggressive goals.
Some sample quotes (
The Threatening Storm, 2002)
"There is little doubt that the Iraqis are continuing to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons," Pollack writes[2002].
"[They] know how to build a nuclear weapon and did so in 1990; the only thing it was missing was the fissile material".
"Meanwhile, regular Iraqi citizens continue to suffer under a regime comparable to that of Stalin. "Torture is not a method of last resort in Iraq, it is often the method of first resort," Pollack writes.
He paints a gruesome portrait of life in Iraq, complete with flagrant human rights abuses and atrocities committed by those in Saddam's circle of power. "This is a regime that will gouge out the eyes of children to force confessions from their parents and grandparents," he writes.
In 2002, after over a decade of diplomacy to get cooperation from Saddam, and with no inspectors since 1998, we were faced with three strategies to deal with him:
-Deterrence
-Containment
-Regime Change (could be accomplished with covert ops, native forces, or invasion)
Deterrence
This would involve removal of all sanctions and allowing restoration of normal trade relations (with Europe, China, and Pakistan, North Korea, etc.), removal of the no fly zones, and counting on our conventional and nuclear deterrent to protect the USA and our allies in the area. The disadvantages here are that it would allow Saddam to rebuild his conventional and nonconventional forces, as well as take full and murderous revenge over his Shia and Kurdish enemies. Probably, as in 1991, hundreds of thousands would die in the ensuing bloodbath. Saddam would also be free to continue funding of Palestinian suicide bombers. Given his history and aspirations as a pan-Arabist, Saddam would almost certainly rebuild his nuclear weapons program to complete his dream of being a regional superpower.
This would lead to a regional arms race, and with it increased tensions with Israel. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey would all feel compelled to build and test nuclear weapons as well, and would be able to easily, absent crippling sanctions. And what of Jordan, our ally, and the most modern and liberalizing Arab state yet?
Within months, Saddam would be able to reconstitute his chemical and biological programs from his mothballed programs. Chemical weapons are 1890s and 1900s technology and the precursors are ubiquitous.
Within, say 5 years, Saddam would have rebuilt his conventional forces and nuclear program (with prewar intel, the number for the nuclear program was thought to be even less).
Scenario: Saddam reinvades Kuwait and threatens to nuke the Saudi oilfields if the world takes action. He could then menace the Saudis into collusion with him to control the supply of over 60% of the world’s oil supply allowing him to set prices effectively. A nuclear-armed Saddam taking over Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia leaves us with a choice between ceding him control of the world's oil supply, or of seeing that supply destroyed and contaminated for decades by a nuclear strike, sending the world's economy into radical shock, perhaps for years. Nothing endangers liberalism, pluralism, and environmentalism like severe economic downturn. See the 1930s. Hardest hit would be the new Eastern European existing at the margins of economic survival and multi-ethnic tensions where the tensions are high (Indonesia, the Balkans, Nigeria, India, China, West Africa, etc.). Change the scenario to add in Jordan or Syria. Imagine the effect that would have on Israel, another nuclear power.
Sound unlikely? Hardly. Deterrence relies on a reasonable, cautious, careful opponent that considers all facets before taking action…. and is able to admit that failure is a possibility and what the costs would be in that case. Saddam was never able to consider that his gambits could fail… he refused to see information that would contradict his vision of victory. Study of Saddam’s history demonstrates a frightening pattern of “bizarre decisions, poor judgment, and catastrophic miscalculations”, of deeply dangerous moves made with “no assessment of risks or costs” (quoting Pollack). This pattern traces back decades into the past, to incidents that predate well-known cases like the Gulf War or the war with Iran. Saddam's 1974 abrogation of his agreement with the Kurds, his attack on Kurdistan, and his baseless belief that the shah of Iran would not intervene against him are good examples. During the Iran-Iraq war, even though Iran had again and again demonstrated its superior ability to harm Iraq with retaliatory missile strikes, Saddam nonetheless repeatedly ordered air and missile strikes against Iranian cities. This was basically because the Iranian cities were much farther from the border than Iraqi cities, necessitating the use of smaller warheads at extreme range. This was a clear breakdown of ordinary "rational" deterrence. After the Gulf War, Saddam threatened to reinvade Kuwait in 1994, ordered the assassination of a former president, and moved tanks to the Syrian border to have access to the Golan Heights to menace Israel. One wonders what he thought would happen to his regime if he had succeeded in killing a former president, or had reinvaded Kuwait.
So it seems that deterrence was at the very least a high risk strategy.
Containment
Containment, the official US policy since the end of the Gulf War, was eroding rapidly, and at the time, it was thought that it had not eliminated Iraq's nuclear weapons program. It certainly had not weakened Saddam Hussein's grip on the country and in many ways strengthened his hand at home and abroad diplomatically. In fact, Saddam Hussein had managed to manipulate the sanctions to his benefit by rewarding supporters inside Iraq with scarce goods and bribing countries outside, like France and Russia, with lucrative oil contracts. The sanctions gave him unprecedented control over the Iraqi economy… much more than he had beforehand.
He was also able to evade sanctions by smuggling oil through Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and even Iran. This was not subtle… there was a pipeline going from Iraq to Syria for example. Dozens of tanker trucks going into Turkey every day… etc. This amounted to billions per year. He was also able to subvert oil sanctions through the oil-for-food program, adding on at least $10 billion more. This was done with the full knowledge of the UN and with involvement at the highest levels- including Kofi Anon’s son. Most of this money was laundered through Russia and Saudi Arabia, and several of the companies used turned out to have known connections with Al-Qaeda. More of the money could have found its way to terrorists by way of Saudi “charities”, though this is currently conjectured.
As a result of oil-for-food, France, China, Germany, and Russia were all actively trading with Iraq, and had tens of billions of dollars per year to lose by renewing containment (or regime change). This is precisely why, up until just before the war, they all worked tirelessly to reduce or remove sanctions… because it was in their own narrow self interests.
The containment policy kept the sanctions on, allowing Saddam to blame the miserable conditions he forced on his people (by spending his illegal gains from smuggling and Oil-for-food on weapons and palaces) on the USA and UN. This played well in the Arab world, building resentment against us. It also forced us to keep troops in Saudi Arabia in case Saddam decided to make a run for the Saudi oilfields. This is significant because it was one of the primary complaints of Bin Laden that he used to justify the wave of terror attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on US targets in the 1990s and of course 9/11.
Containment also necessitated the maintenance of the No Fly Zones, that amounted to hundreds of thousands of sorties over the 13 years or so they were in place. This was not cheap, either.
Saddam did not voluntarily disarm in a cooperative fashion after UN Resolution 1441. No one disputes that he remained in violation. We know what voluntary disarmament looks like, because we’ve seen it in South Africa and in Libya. Those regimes actively divulged everything, leading inspectors to sites and revealing all phases of their programs. Instead Saddam allowed inspectors back in to play hide and seek. In retrospect it is not clear why he did things this way… was he deceived by corrupt underlings into believing that he had weapons? Did he think that the coalition was bluffing? Or that France and Russia would bail him out at the last minute in the UN? Was this just another of his disastrous miscalculations?
Recall that it took surrounding Iraq with hundreds of thousands of coalition soldiers and issuing an ultimatum in the UN just to get the inspectors back in to play hide and seek. This level of deployment was unsustainable just to keep inspectors in. Once thee troops went home the inspectors would find less and less cooperation until they had to leave in frustration as in 1998. Then with the money Saddam was garnering from smuggling and oil-for-food he could rebuild his weapons programs and we would be dealing with a de facto deterrence situation, a very risky proposition as noted above.
Regional allies like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were willing to stick their necks out
one more time for the USA (and the Saudis barely at that)… but not for half measures. If they thought that they were going to have to live with a resurgent Iraq (due to erosion of sanctions etc.) then they would need to hedge their bets and cozy up to Saddam a little… and that would mean not provoking him by constantly readmitting thousands of troops for the sole purpose of keeping inspectors in (and as soon as the troops went home, the inspectors would be kicked out restarting the cycle).
Regime Change
There was no sign of any impending collapse of Saddam’s regime. There were three possibilities over time (waiting for Saddam to die would have taken years, and his sons were being groomed to take power following his death):
1. Spontaneous evolution into a more liberal regime with abandonment of pan-arabist aspirations, support for Palestinian terror, and totalitarian oppression of its people. Unlikely to say the least.
2. Spontaneous implosion. Possible, but as above, there were no signs of this. And this would have led to complete disorder and civil war with millions displaced or dead of thirst, starvation, disease, and violence. It is also unlikely that Syria and Iran and Turkey would just sit idly around while Iraq descended into chaos. They would "respond to provocation" and "protect their borders" and "protect the oilfields" by occupying large swaths of the country.And don't forget: we thought at the time that there were stockpiles of WMD there that would then have fallen into the hands of terrorists or other countries. It would have been a total disaster.
3. External Regime Change: Covert operations were unlikely to succeed, and there were no groups in Iraq that could have successfully challenged even the weakened Saddam, even with American airpower assisting. There was no “Northern Alliance” in Iraq. Forces of that type (and their leaders) were all crushed in 1991 by Saddam after the Gulf War. The only option left over was invasion.
Recall also that the best intelligence of several nation suggested that there would be stockpiles of WMD found (the US, UK, Russian, and even French and German intelligence supported this). Multiple independant reviews in the US and UK found no evidence of warping of the intel or pressure placed on the intelligence gatherers. Since the invasion, the Russian President has stated that Russian intel passed along a warning that Saddam was planning attacks on US interests.
A responsible leader would have no choice. Just ask Bill Clinton:
Clinton defends successor's push for war
Says Bush 'couldn't responsibly ignore' chance Iraq had WMDs