There has been a lot of concern about the current status in Iraq and the intended strategy going forward, particularly in light of the media's continued barrage of news reports highlight civil disobedience and seemingly widespread militant attacks. It's time to step back a bit from the situation and review the current state of affairs more objectively:
Recent news sounds worrisome. What is the plan?
The current problems stem from a combination of external terrorists (Al-Qaeda for example) and a local Sunni resistance. Many Sunnis (about 20% of the population in Iraq) are nervous. They have benefited from what was essentially a local empire, culminated by their control of the other subgroups in Iraq (Kurds and Shi’a) for the last 1000 years or so. It has allowed them to carry out a colonial-like exploitation of the rest of Iraq’s resources, particularly oil and water. These resources are in short supply in the Sunni triangle, but are plentiful elsewhere. Accordingly, control of the majority of Iraq’s population over the last 30 years had taken on an increasingly totalitarian flavor highlighted by domination of the military and of the positions in power.
Former regime elements are worried that, in addition to losing control over the rest of Iraq and its important resources, they will be subject to reprisals from angry Kurds and Shi’a. They also are concerned by a reduction in shared resources (particularly oil) that are lacking in the Sunni triangle. In short, it is thought that they have everything to lose and will be left behind in a new Iraq. Sadly, perhaps the ruling coalition has done an unsatisfactory job in assuring them of a future in the new Iraq.
These residual regime elements escaped the initial fighting for several reasons. The lack of a northern front along the Turkish border allowed many of these elements to get away unscathed. Though the United States’ rapid advance overwhelmed the south, having focused on gaining territory and bypassing pockets of resistance, it had the unintended consequence of allowing these resistance fighters to also get away with their weapons.
For a better frame of reference, bear in mind that ‘insurgents’ continued to take potshots at American forces in Germany and Italy through 1948, some 3 years after the second World War came to and end. However, it is true that the situation wasn't nearly as bad as in Iraq, butonly because most of those who could have become insurgents were killed (the majority of the Waffen SS were killed) and the rest were exhausted. Also, there were not many spare assault rifles, RPGs, and explosives (or explosive experts) available.
Unfortunately, Saddam handed out millions of assault rifles prior to our invasion, emptied his jails of all the common criminals (about 50,000), and had thousands of hidden weapons cachets throughout Iraq. Moreover, he stashed billions of dollars now available to fund the insurgency. Add to this figure the many more who escaped our initial onslaught and it is easy to grasp the current situation. To be indelicate, there are 10,000 to 20,000 indoctrinated fascists in the Sunni triangle that need to be neutralized before the rest of the area and Iraq can more fully embrace a democratic liberal future. It would be a shame to allow them to impose their will on the rest of the population simply because they are willing to use violence. Ultimately, their targeting of the Iraqi police will only alienate them from the populace.
Security should markedly improve following the Nov/Dec planned offensive in the Sunni Triangle. The only thing hold up is the rate of Iraqi Special Forces training which can not be rushed. When coalition forces attacked last April, marines killed hundreds of insurgents, but concurrently created a groundswell of anger on the ground by alienating the populace despite limited, precise strikes. A decision was made to pull back and wait until enough Iraqi troops were ready to participate and make it appear as though Iraqis themselves were securing the country from outsiders.
There are currently 6 battalions of Iraqi Special Forces on the ready. By the end of October, there should be a total 12 battalions (about 8400 men). By January, there are projected to be 27 such battalions. This will be in addition to over 100,000 police officers and another 100,000 or so less extensively trained Iraqi troops, allowing for a more significant participation by Iraqis while simultaneously splitting the resistance into those who just oppose the occupation on general nationalist principle and those who oppose a future open, free Iraq. Compounding this authenticity, national elections will put in what should be seen as a legitimate government by the majority of Iraqis early next year. Now is not the time to go wobbly.
Essentially, the coalition is trying to set up a situation similar in nature to the one that worked well in Afghanistan, including supporting indigenous forces with air power (and in this case with infantry and armor). The hope is that extremists will wear out their welcome as did Sadr in Najaf (where he is now a persona non grata) and as they did in Samarra. However, it would be disingenuous not to expect the level of violence to increase as the election nears. We can't expect the Sunni former regime elements that have everything to lose not to fight.
Once these antidemocratic elements are cleared out, stability should be sufficient to allow economic expansion and reconstruction to occur. Once a legitimately elected Iraqi government is in place, much of the “general principle” nationalist opposition to the western troops should lose support.
Nevertheless, the current spate of terrorist bombings has not dissuaded thousands more from signing up for the IP and the new Iraqi army. In interviews, many have said that although they are scared, the bombings only increase their determination. Additionally, there have been recent demonstrations in Baghdad against terrorism. Web sites, such as
Iraq the Model, have sprung up that are managed by those living in Baghdad and Basra. While they do not represent the entire population, it is refreshing to hear a moderate voice over there, and they will continue to need our help.
Aren't we just creating more terrorists in Iraq?
There’s no evidence to support this assertion whatsoever. In the short run, I'm willing to concede that there clearly has been an increase in terrorist activity. However, in the long run, freedom, prosperity, and collective security are
the answer in the Middle East, just as they were to the seemingly intractable problem of imperialist Europe in the 20th century. Firm resolve and action will motivate moderates to action as well.
These so-called ‘new’ terrorists are raw, green, and untrained amateurs. The terror training camps have been vanquished. Expert, seasoned terrorists are being killed by the score in Iraq, and many more perished in Afghanistan. This is the key advantage to taking the fight to the enemy. Also, terror funding is being halted, largely as a result of regime change. Evidence continues to spew forth that part of the Oil-For-Food money was being siphoned off into accounts for terrorists. Some terrorists are simply ‘retiring’ under the pressure. Exhibit Qaddafi, who had managed to produce weapons grade plutonium before he voluntarily disarmed last year. Lastly, there is a compelling realpolitik case for regime change
as detailed extensively in a prior post. Clearly, the advantages of US foreign policy outweigh the disadvantages. That's really all you can ask for.
The totalitarianisms of the Middle East squeeze out all aspects of civil society (political parties, clubs, professional associations, trade unions, etc) except that of the Mosque. There is no way to vent frustration or gather in groups except at the mosque, ultimately radicalizing the populace. Free Muslims (and others) rarely participate in terrorism (see Indonesian, Malaysian, Turkish, Israeli, or American Muslims). The nihilism of the terrorists is counteracted by the hope and feeling of control over one's life that is the legacy of freedom. In this vein, spreading freedom IS combating terrorism.
From
OxBlog:
THINK GLOBALLY, ACT LOCALLY: Apparently, that's Al Qaeda's new strategy. The LA Times also insists very forcefully that Muslim outrage at the invasion of Iraq has created a new generation of terrorists. That's a respectable hypothesis, but every time I hear it I want to know why the invasion of Iraq was so different from the invasion of Afghanistan. If Muslims -- especially Arabs -- tend to believe that the Mossad and the CIA were responsible for September 11th, why was the invasion of Afghanistan any less provocative than the invasion of Iraq? Are Muslims and Arabs so committed to upholding international law that they will murder Turkish, Iraqi and Indonesian civilians in order to vent their outrage? What I'm getting at, of course, is that American journalists project their own moral judgments onto the behavior Arab and Muslim terrorists. It is possible, of course, that Arabs and Muslims did perceive the invasion of Iraq as a uniquely offensive act. But if so, why? And what is the evidence?
Along those same lines, consider
Andrew Sullivan’s comments:
ARE THE JIHADISTS LOSING? A new book says so. The key is the way in which these murderous theocrats are now killing more Muslims than infidels. Would any sane Muslim want to live in Falluja? Money quote: "The principal goal of terrorism -
to seize power in Muslim countries through mobilization of populations galvanized by jihad's sheer audacity - has not been realized," Kepel writes. In fact, bin Laden's followers are losing ground: The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been toppled; the fence-sitting semi-Islamist regime in Saudi Arabia has taken sides more strongly with the West; Islamists in Sudan and Libya are in retreat; and the plight of the Palestinians has never been more dire. And Baghdad, the traditional seat of the Muslim caliphs, is under foreign occupation. Not what you would call a successful jihad.
The Realist Party’s sentiments exactly.
Is it possible to create democracy in the Middle East?
We had success in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Democracy has made strides in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Turkey, and Indonesia. Muslims live in democratic societies in India, Israel, and the United States. Democracy has adapted to each of these different cultures. Though lacking a democratic history, Arab states do have a tradition of consultative local government (based on tribal structure), complete with councils and political bartering. These characteristics (vital to a democratic society) were missing from the authoritarian structures of Japanese and German society. It is why you see much more progress at the local level in Iraq, though national progress toward representative government is evident as well with the upcoming elections in January.
Wouldn't things be better with a UN mandate? Wouldn't that remove the "American Stigma" from the occupation?
Removing the "American Stigma" would just be replaced by a "Western Stigma". It is important to understand that fanatical Muslims make no distinction. The Sunni insurgents would still fight to keep the control of Iraq that they have enjoyed for the last 1000 years. They know that there's no oil in the Sunni triangle and in order to enjoy its benefits, they think that they need to run the whole country. Continuing, wahabbi terrorists wouldn't care either. They want an Islamic fascist totalitarian dictatorship. A broader UN-based effort might actually hinder progress toward democracy because there is a tradition among those not in the Iraq coalition of doing business with autocrats and a realpolitik-inspired favoring of stability over progression in the Middle East. It is a strategy that may have made some sense during the Cold War, but is now clearly maladaptive.
Aren't we playing into Bin Laden's hands by invading Afghanistan and Iraq?
Some critics claim that Bin Laden had a master plan to create a clash of civilizations, and that the coalition is falling into his trap. Bin Laden had his Shari'a utopia in Afghanistan and could have built upon it there unmolested by the west. He could have just minded his own business. But he and the islamo-fascists couldn't help themselves. They had to throw it all away. The same could be said for Iran and their mullahs.
Why was it so hard for them just to keep to themselves? The answer is because Islamo-fascism is inherently chauvinist, militaristic, and expansionist. They can't provide for their people's needs, so they instead do what (ironically) Bush is accused of doing: using external events and jihad (war) to distract their populace from domestic concerns and keep the spirit of ‘revolution’ alive.
I doubt that Bin Laden wanted to be kicked out of power and have his dreams of a shari'a fascist utopia crushed. Furthermore, in the end does it really matter what he wants? Especially if what he wants is actually bad for his cause in the long run? The answer is ‘no’.
Aren't preventive wars a bad idea?
Some seem to think that the only wars worth fighting are the ones where national survival is on the line, such as in WWII. Another view, however, is that we need to keep a situation from getting to that point. For example: when Hitler renounced the arms limitations set upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1935 and when he re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, a small preventive war with Germany might have crushed Hitler and the Nazi movement with only a minimal loss of life (perhaps as little as 20,000-30,000 troops on both sides). This preemptive action would have saved the world over 50 million dead in WWII, in addition to the 6 million Jews killed during the Holocaust (out of a total world population of about 10 million at the time).
The current situation in Iraq and the Middle East is analogous. We need to act and encourage change before inevitable nuclear proliferation puts the power of the atom into the hands of regimes for whom there is no mutually agreed upon deterrence. That time to act is now!